(xi) Preface

Beschrijft de inhoud van deze tweede editie, de veranderingen, en zo verder. En eindigt helaas weer met het bedanken en ophemelen van zijn partner.

[Wanneer leren mensen in een boek eens af iedereen te bedanken?]

(1) Introduction

"Like other fields in philosophy, the issues involved in philosophizing about love, sex, and marriage fall into two groups: conceptual and evaluative. The first are concerned with defining and clarifying concepts, the second with assessing whether particular actions and practices are good or bad, in the moral sense, but also in other senses (e.g., aesthetic)." [mijn nadruk] (1)

Vervolgens worden een heleboel vragen op dat terrein opgesomd, waarover het dus zal gaan.

"These are some of the main issues addressed in this book. My hope is that reflecting on them not only clarifies our thinking but also affects our values, orienting us to make changes in our actions and lives so that we treat others more justly, think of them more openly, and place the proper values on love, sex, and marriage."(2)

[Dat is in ieder geval een lofwaardig streven. Mensen met een vorm van moralisme verbeteren is hard nodig.]

"Romantic love is one of the most crucial aspects by which we measure whether a life is successful or not."(3)

[Dat is nogal een uitspraak.]

"But romantic love has its ugly side: when in its power we become obsessed, and we do things for the beloved that we would not under normal, (usually) sane conditions. The beloved becomes the center of our world for no earthly obvious reason, and only the strong few can maintain their moral standing and reason during this emotional hurricane. And when the passion of love calms down, and love becomes more like companionship, it resembles friendship more and more, thereby losing its edge as romantic love. And insofar as love insists on prioritizing the beloved, on exclusivity, on sexual fidelity, on domesticity, it can become a psychological, physical, emotional, and social prison — “domestic gulag” as Laura Kipnis refers to it. Love also discriminates against those who reject it or don’t have it. Single people can feel left out, and are made to feel like losers. Thus, love has its values and its disvalues." [mijn nadruk] (3)

[Dat bedoelde ik. Goed geformuleerd.]

"But sexual desire and activity have their negative aspects: sexual desire objectifies—it reduces people to their bodies, and the pleasures of sex often rise in direct proportion to its objectifying activity. Nothing can dampen sexual pleasure more than the intrusion of moral considerations for the other." [mijn nadruk] (4)

[Ook nogal een uitspraak. Waarom zou seksueel verlangen niet ook ontstaan door iemands persoonlijkheid, waarom dat alleen koppelen aan lichaam en uiterlijk? ]

"Thus, sexual activity, otherwise a merely biological activity, becomes infused with both value and disvalue when it exists among human animals (maybe among other animals also)." [mijn nadruk] (4)

Een dergelijke afweging voor het huwelijk.

"It sends the message to the rest of the world that the spouses are together and committed to each other. It provides stability for the spouses and for children, should there be any. It removes from the state the burden of taking care of people when they are old, relegating that job to the spouses (this is perhaps one reason why the state encourages marriage by providing the spouses with a lot of benefits).(...)
On the other hand, marriage, insofar as it involves the state in intimate relationships in deep and complicated ways, given all the laws and legal regulations surrounding it, is not always a good thing. It makes divorce a nightmare of a process, often forcing couples to stay together when they should not. Marriage also normalizes people, straitjacketing them into specific ways of life. Marriage also socially discriminates against single people, against people who are in deep, supporting relationships that as of yet receive no help from the state—in the United States: no tax breaks, no zoned housing, no hospital visitation rights, no immigration rights, no health benefits. Marriage is an institution that (unwittingly perhaps) discriminates against singles, against friendships, against other caring relationships. Yet if we reform it to the point of making it just, it becomes unrecognizable. It loses its edge and specialness as marriage." [mijn nadruk] (4-5)

[Het is kritisch en toch heb ik nu al de indruk dat hij niet tegen het huwelijk is, want hij formuleert wel erg voorzichtig. Als je ziet wat er op tegen is, kun je volgens mij alleen maar tegen het huwelijk zijn.]

(7) Part I - Love

(9) 1 - What Is Romantic Love?

"Moreover, I will shortly distinguish between two forms of romantic love, the passionate or sexual form and the settled or companionate form. Although many philosophers note this crucial distinction when explaining the different types of love, they soon abandon it and discuss romantic love as a unitary phenomenon. However, not maintaining the distinction between these two forms of romantic love can lead, and has led, to the many entanglements we see in philosophical discussions about love, such as whether it is involuntary, whether it is responsive to reasons, and whether it is a selfish emotion. We will then need this distinction. Let us start with the question as to what type of thing romantic love is." [mijn nadruk] (10)

Een antwoord is: liefde is een emotie. Maar anderen beweren: het zijn lichamelijke, bijvoorbeeld chemische, processen. Zij wijst die eenzijdigheid af.

"It is instructive in this sense to think of other phenomena with a dual nature: most, if not all, of our emotions are probably rooted in some way in brain activity, yet are expressed, evaluated, and taken up differently depending on the culture and the time period. Ditto for sexual desire: it is a biological appetite, yet one that is always robed in cultural and social expressions and values." [mijn nadruk] (11-12)

"A fourth, crucial reason for the irrelevancy of the scientific explanation of romantic love is that a proper understanding of romantic love might not require a scientific explanation at all."(12)

[Goed gezien.]

"For all these reasons, I will set aside the scientific discussion of love and move to other accounts of love’s nature."(13)

"Thus, the view of constructionist functionalism still requires filling in and seems to not be a genuine or deep social constructionist view."(15)

"Despite the popularity of the belief that love is an emotion, some philosophers argue that it is not an emotion, and that it is something else, such as a desire."(15)

"Note that understanding love as desires avoids the “reasons” objection to romantic love; that is, if there are cases of romantic love that arise not because of reasons (“I don’t know why I love him, I just do”), understanding love as desire does not face this problem because many desires are also not responsive to reasons or reason-based: there is no reason as to why I want to have a chocolate croissant right now; I just do. This would account for the widespread phenomenon of falling in love with someone inexplicably (sometimes in the face of massive evidence that the person is a scoundrel). In such cases, any reasons given to explain the love are given retroactively. No one ever says, “Haeun is a good woman?? Introduce her to me and I will fall in love with her!” If only.
Insofar as there are two forms of romantic love, one being more passionate and sexual (which I call “RL1”) and the other being more about commitment, attachments, and companionship (“RL2”), it might be truer to understand the first form of love as a desire or a set of desires, and the second as an emotion. Here are some reasons that support this idea." [mijn nadruk] (16)

"Romantic love, as such, is neither moral nor immoral. Depending on a host of factors (such as whether the lover is himself moral or immoral), it can be either. With all due respect to the popular view that love makes people better, this is not guaranteed.(...) Put simply, romantic love is not in itself a moral excellence. This fact is sufficient to rule it out as a virtue on the grounds that virtues are, by definition, moral excellences."(18)

[Het begin nu wel erg academisch te worden, met de bespreking van allerlei andere theorietjes van allerlei andere auteurs.]

Conclusie na deze afwegingen:

"We can then tentatively conclude that romantic love admits of two forms, the passionate and the settled, RL1 and RL2, such that it is more accurate to characterize the former as a desire (or set of desires) and the latter as a dispositional emotion (which includes desires, though the desires of RL1 might be fundamentally different from those of RL2). Moreover, and although love, in both its forms, might be rooted in our biology or, more generally, in our physical makeup (in case there are creatures who love yet whose physical makeup is nothing like ours), it always takes particular social and cultural forms, though the accurate explanation between the physical and the cultural sides is yet to be articulated. The distinction between RL1 and RL2 has played a crucial role so far in our discussion. It is time to make the distinction clearer." [mijn nadruk] (20)

"Both RL1 and RL2 are forms of romantic love. This is reflected in popular opinion, common linguistic usage, and general social and cultural mores. For example, we say that “John and Lisa love each other” to refer not only to the budding emotion between them (RL1), but also to the emotion after they have been together for years (RL2). Moreover, philosophers and others have come to accept this distinction." [mijn nadruk] (22)

[Dat lijkt me een woordenspel. Waarom zou ik RL1 niet romantische liefde noemen en RL2 realistische liefde of zoiets, om het verschil in passie uit te laten komen? En als je erg van seks houdt is alleen RL1 romantische liefde en RL2 de dood in de pot.]

"To recapitulate, what characterizes RL1 and RL2 (and sets them apart from each other) is the following: RL1 (1) is a deeply passionate, almost obsessive-like state with the beloved; (2) the lover’s attention and focus is concentrated on the beloved; and (3) the lover has intense, frequent, even exclusive, sexual desire for the beloved. RL2, on the other hand, (1) is settled, calmer, and less passionate; and (2) the sexual desire for the beloved is weak (or infrequent), nonexistent, or not exclusive. Further below, I will defend an additional two characteristics: (1) that in RL1 the concern for the beloved is not necessarily for the beloved’s own sake (it is not robust), while in RL2 it is, and (2) that in RL1 there is no necessary commitment for the relationship and the well-being and happiness of the beloved, whereas in RL2 there is."(22)

[Hier zitten waardeoordelen over verliefdheid in. RL1 (3): waaom zou je ineens exclusieve seksuele verlangens voelen voor iemand? Dan zeg je ook dat iemand niet op meerdere mensen tegelijkertijd verliefd kan zijn. Maar waarom zou dat niet kunnen?]

"Both RL1 and RL2 are forms of romantic love because of the physical and other forms of intimacy in both of them. In this regard, we have to be careful to not fully assimilate RL2 to some sort of friendship love. (...) Both RL1 and RL2 are forms of romantic love not only because sexual activity continues to occur in many cases of RL2 but because of the kind of physical, emotional, and practical intimacy that exists in RL2 that is characteristic of romantic love but not of other forms of companionate love."(22)

"None of this denies that some or all of the above features might be found in some friendships, sibling relationships, and other companionate love. But it is to say that they do not characterize them."(23)

"People often claim that they love someone because he or she is smart, kind, or beautiful. This seems to indicate that people love for reasons or that there are reasons that can explain love. If we ask x, “Why do you love y?” x can, in principle, give us reasons for x’s love. On the other hand, if this were true, it is a puzzle why x does not love z, who has the same properties that y has, if not even to a higher degree. This gives rise to the question of the role of reasons in love." [mijn nadruk] (26)

"Put differently, do we love someone because of reasons, or is love not based on reasons?"(26)

"The reason view of love, as we shall call it, is that x loves y because of y’s properties: y’s properties are x’s reasons for loving y. The no-reason view of love, on the other hand, states that x’s love for y is not based on y’s properties. It might be based on x’s own properties or it might be gratuitous, a gift-like form of love that x bestows on y." [mijn nadruk] (26)

Bespreking van beide vormen. Tegen de 'liefde zonder redenen' opvatting brengt Halwani o.a. in:

"Third, the no-reason view puts constancy in danger: if love can appear for no reason, it can also disappear for no reason. Fourth, it puts exclusivity in danger: if x can love y for no reason, then x can love z (at the same time) for no reason. Fifth, it puts uniqueness in danger: if x can love y for no reason, then x can love z for no reason. Sixth and finally, the view goes against why people want to be loved."(27)

[Dat kan allemaal wel zijn, maar is misschien desondanks het meest eerlijk. De redenen die mensen in de eerste visie geven zijn vaak oneerlijk. Het zijn niet meer dan woorden die mensen willen horen, want zo moet echte liefde zijn, nietwaar. En dan blijkt in de praktijk liefde voor een ander net zo gemakkelijk.]

"Although I believe that the reason-view is more plausible, I hope to show that both views are actually correct, except that the no-reason view is true of or better characterizes RL1 while the reason view is true of or better characterizes RL2 (but indirectly). Thus, the distinction between RL1 and RL2 is crucial for this discussion, and each view captures what is crucial about each form of romantic love."(30)

[Waarna een hoop geanalyzeer volgt dat alleen relevant is voor academici.]

"Thus, both the reason view and the no-reason view of love are correct, except that each is correct about a different form of love.20 We can even claim that RL1 and RL2 are very different forms of love from each other: RL1 is characterized by passion, by the strength of sexual desire for the beloved, by constant deep longing to be with the beloved, by self-interested concern for the beloved, by lacking genuine commitment to the beloved, and by not being responsive to reasons. RL2 is characterized by genuine commitment to the beloved, by robust concern for the beloved, by deep attachment to the beloved, and by being responsive to reasons. They are, nonetheless, both forms of romantic love because of the kind of physical and emotional intimacy they involve, which sets them generally apart from other forms of love."(42-43)

(47) 2 - The Characteristics and the Object of Love

"There are popular beliefs about love, such as that it is exclusive and constant, and that the beloved is unique. These beliefs reflect the idea that exclusivity, constancy, and uniqueness are all characteristics of romantic love. In this section, we will consider these characteristics and a few more, including the beloved as irreplaceable, love as concern for the beloved, love as union between the lovers, and sexual desire as a crucial element of romantic love. There is also the question as to whether any of these features are essential to romantic love and whether they serve to set it apart from other forms of love. We will briefly attend to these questions also." [mijn nadruk] (47)

[Ik lees dan meteen de invloed van de westerse samenleving.]

"The exclusivity of romantic love could mean one of two things. It could mean, first, that if x loves y during t, then x loves y and only y during t. That is, x cannot love more than one person at a time.(...) The issue, then, is whether one can romantically love more than one person simultaneously." [mijn nadruk] (47)

[Dat is zo typisch voor angelsaksische filosofie: pogingen om exact over te komen. Dit hier is nog niet eens ergerlijk. Maar soms ...]

"Three considerations indicate that romantic love is not exclusive (or that modal monogamy is false)."(48)

"Why is the belief in romantic love’s exclusivity popular? The confusion between RL1 and RL2 could be one reason. Out of the two, RL1 seems to be the exclusive one, or at least it feels that way. When in its grip, the lover feels no passion for anyone other than the beloved and feels that her passion will last forever (which explains the second meaning of “exclusivity” mentioned above).(...) Thus, exclusivity, if true of romantic love, is true of only RL1, not RL2." [mijn nadruk] (48)

[Dat is onzin en een waardeoordeel op basis van een cultuur. Het vervelende is dat hij hier bij RL1 dan stopt met zijn analyse bij de vraag. De vraag gaat dan alleen nog over RL2.]

"Moreover, if certain cultures are opposed to non-exclusive love, with time social and cultural institutions will bend themselves to this desire, making it more practically difficult for non- exclusive lovers to function well, which makes it rarer for such arrangements to exist, which in turn makes us believe that it is somehow practically easier, in itself, for love to be exclusive between two people."(48)

"Although it is true that for romantic love to succeed it needs trust, privacy, and intimacy, the argument does not show love’s exclusivity; instead it shows only that love’s non-exclusivity cannot mean having too many beloveds, a claim different from the one that love is confined to one and only one person at a time." [mijn nadruk] (49)

"Clearly, we are able to show deep concern for more than one person (though, again, not for too many), so this third argument fails."(49)

"If we assume this, we tip the scales unfairly in favor of exclusivity by making it virtually impossible for a lover to show concern for or be intimate with more than one beloved. This is why people in polyamorous relationships often designate one relationship as primary, another as secondary, and so on (Shotwell 2017)." [mijn nadruk] (50)

"Polyamorous love relationships may not be com- mon, but their rarity might be explained by the social bias against them. This does not mean that there are many closeted polyamorists out there that we do not know about (there may or may not be), but it does mean that social bias helps form people’s psychologies in such a way that they fear, hate, or do not desire polyamory. There is much to be learned from recent writings on polyamory and on the lives of polyamorists, as such accounts can make vivid and real what seems to many to be impossible, to wit, carrying on multiple romantic love relationships (Anapol 2010; Shotwell 2017)." [mijn nadruk] (50)

[Goed gezien.]

"The idea underlying the belief in the constancy of romantic love is that for love to be real or genuine it must endure or last for a long time. This is a belief that we have, by the way, about other forms of love: parent-child love is surely considered constant, and so is friendship love. But how should we understand constancy?" [mijn nadruk] (50)

Ik denk dat dat zelfs niet hoeft te gelden voor liefde voor je kinderen of voor vrienden.]

"Yet strict constancy cannot be a characteristic of romantic love, not unless we are willing to declare most loves a sham, given that in many cases of love the love goes away after some time. This is certainly true of RL1 but also true to some extent of RL2."(51)

"Perhaps another reason for believing in constancy is our belief that love is unconditional: x will love y no matter what happens to y or how y changes. This is supported by the fact that unconditional love is found in other forms of love relationships, especially the love of parents for their children, so it might operate also in romantic love."(51)

[Onvoorwaardelijke liefde bestaat zelfs niet bij de relatie ouders - kinderen. Dat is ook al een culturele mythe. ]

"Indeed, even in parent-child love, it would be perfectly understandable (even honorable, I would say), if a parent were to cease loving their child were their child to become a horrible person."(51-52)

[Dat bedoelde ik.]

"Thus, given that many RL1s are not constant, even the most plausible reason for constancy, commitment, does not take us so far as to believe in constancy’s essentiality for love. Some loves are loves even if they are not constant, especially those of RL1, but sometimes those of RL2 as well."(52)

"People often think that the beloved is unique. Why they think so is not so clear, though it probably stems from how lovers feel in RL1"(52)

"Of course, and especially in RL1, the lover might believe that the beloved is unique and this would explain, to some extent, the prevalence of the belief in uniqueness. This is true as far as it goes, but it does not establish the truth of the belief in uniqueness, which is what we want. After all, lovers believe many things, but this has nothing to do with finding out the truth about romantic love."(53)

"The fact of the matter is that people are not unique in any interesting ways. And they need to have interesting uniqueness if uniqueness is to be the basis of someone’s love for another. Moreover, even if people are unique in interesting ways, uniqueness would not secure the love’s exclusivity. Even though Melania loves Donald based on his uniqueness, she can still love someone else based on that other person’s uniqueness (Soble 1990, 65–66)."(53)

"If all these beliefs about romantic love do not withstand much scrutiny, why do many people believe them? The phenomenology of romantic love, especially of RL1, is such that while in it lovers feel and think that their love for the beloved is exclusive and constant, and that their beloved is unique.(...) These facts might help explain why we have these beliefs about romantic love. We might also have them because they make us feel special: being loved because we are unique and irreplaceable, and being loved exclusively and constantly makes us feel valuable, special, important, and, well, loveable. These in turn might help us have or maintain our self-respect, which is important for any working relationship and for our daily comportment (Soble 1990, 67). Still, maintaining our self-respect on the basis of delusional beliefs is not a good idea."(54)

[Die laatste zin is een prachtige 'understatement'. Hierna volgt weer een academische bespreking van auteurs als Nozick en Solomon.]

"Should we give up union or robust concern as a characteristic of love? We should give up union, because there are difficulties with it independent of its being in tension with robust concern, and because the idea of robust concern better explains what happens to the lover when the beloved’s well-being goes up (or down)." [mijn nadruk] (60)

"The restriction of autonomy (one of the features of Nozick’s “we”) might not exactly be a positive feature of love or something to look forward to, but it is a feature of love. It also exists in both RL1 and RL2. In RL1 it takes on more of a feeling of lack of independence, in which the lovers feel that their happiness depends on the presence of the other in their life. In RL2 it takes on more practical dimensions, though the feeling aspect is also there." [mijn nadruk] (63-64)

"It is another common belief that lovers show concern for each other. If x claims to love y, but x shows no concern for y’s well-being and happiness, it is virtually impossible to defend the claim that x really loves y." [mijn nadruk] (64)

"So we do not always act selfishly. And if it is not true that we always act selfishly, it needs to be shown why in romantic love we do."(65)

"Should the happiness or well-being of the beloved be seen through the lover’s or the beloved’s eyes? That is, should we think of the well-being of the beloved in terms of how the lover thinks of it or how the beloved does?"(69)

"We know that in romantic love, x’s concern for y can be robust, that in many cases it is indeed robust, that x sometimes needs to make sacrifices for y, and that x and y need not always agree on the nature of y’s welfare. Underlining all this is the idea that romantic love, like all types of love, necessarily involves concern for the beloved’s well-being. However, if x’s view of y’s well-being is warped, can we still defend this claim?"(71)

[Hier wordt het allemaal erg academisch: dit soort filosofische analyses vind ik totaal niet interessant. Te gedetaileerd.]

"It is often thought that the distinguishing mark of romantic love from other forms of love is sex. Indeed, one of the crucial features of RL1 is the lover’s sexual desire for the beloved. The lover in RL1 has intense sexual desires for the beloved to the point of not desiring anyone else." [mijn nadruk] (73)

[Die invulling van RL1 richting exclusiviteit komt steeds terug, maar is niet onderbouwd.]

"Romantic love has an interesting feature: it allows two people to be intimate with each other physically, emotionally, and mentally. Having sex, of course, is one crucial way that physical intimacy occurs, but it is not the only one. Lovers snuggle with each other, hold hands, walk arm-in-arm, put their heads on each other’s laps, give each other massages (including ones that, say, friends do not give each other, such as foot massages), they playfully slap each other’s butts, they take showers together or in front of each other, and they use the bathroom in front of each other, to give a few examples of the kind of physical familiarity that exists between them." [mijn nadruk] (75)

"Surely one crucial feature of romantic love is longing to be with the beloved. The longing is not just to have sex with the beloved, but to be in his or her presence; to be with him or her in general; to do things together; to enjoy things together. It is one of the crucial desires that characterize RL1 (especially on the desire view of love). This longing, which characterizes RL1, is absent from RL2. " [mijn nadruk] (76)

"Finally, romantic love involves the deep pain at the loss of the beloved. The loss can be owing to many things, be it the death of love (especially on the part of the beloved) or the death of the beloved. Whether in RL1 or in RL2, the loss can be severe. Yet it is also different."(76)

[Hierna weer eindeloos lange filosofische analyses op details die ik alleen scan. Af en toe komen zelfs opvattingen met 'god' langs, zoals met Kierkegaard. Waarom zou je daar nog op ingaan?]

(93) 3 - Love and Morality

"More specifically, we want to know in what ways romantic love is at odds with morality and in what ways it is sanctioned by morality. Morality divides actions into right and wrong, and subdivides right actions into the permissible, the obligatory, and the supererogatory (those difficult and sacrificial actions which go beyond what is required of us). Wrong actions are ones we should not do, permissible (and supererogatory) actions are ones we may do, and obligatory actions are ones we must do. To which category does romantic love belong? And does this question even make sense since love is an emotion, not an action?" [mijn nadruk] (93)

Is Romantic Love Morally Obligatory?

"Romantic love is not under people’s control. If people cannot just decide to fall in love, whether with a particular person or in general (this is true of all emotions; we cannot just decide to hate, envy, or be jealous of so-and-so), then romantic love is not under our command, which means it is not something we are able to do at will. It violates the “ought implies can” principle, so it cannot be obligatory." [mijn nadruk] (94)

"Once we consider rights, which are the flipside of obligations, we can better see why there is no obligation to romantically love another. No y has a right against x that x romantically love y. No person can demand of me that I romantically love him or her."(95)

Is Romantic Love Morally Prohibited?

"There are at least two reasons to believe that romantic love is morally prohibited. The first is that love is selfish, a reason with which we have already dealt in the last chapter, and we have seen that it is not a good reason. The second is that romantic love involves preferential treatment."(95)

"This point is important because it shows that there is a mistake in Ehman’s (and Kierkegaard’s) reasoning, which is the belief that because a relationship involves preferential treatment it is morally wrong. Perhaps the truth in reasoning such as Ehman’s is that such relationships are morally wrong when they excessively privilege the beloved or when the love is at the expense of our obligations to others. We shall return to this point below." [mijn nadruk] (96)

"So the thought that romantic love is morally suspicious because it involves preferential treatment is misguided. Morality should allow preferential treatment."(96)

[Jawel, maar de vraag blijft dus wanneer je in de fout gaat met een voorkeursbehandeling ]

"Romantic love, then, is neither morally obligatory nor morally prohibited; it is morally permissible. In addition, the main moral theories agree and make room for it. Let us see how."(97)

"I focus on the three major moral theories—consequentialism, Kantian ethics, and virtue ethics—and conclude with a discussion of “commonsense” morality. "(97)

[Het punt is al gescoord, waarom dan uitweiden naar allerlei morele theorieën?]

"If love involves the elevation and the preferential treatment of one person (the beloved) over others, there is a serious moral risk that the lovers might neglect their duties to others. If love tends to make lovers excessively attentive to each other, it would be morally suspicious in Kantian eyes." [mijn nadruk] (101)

"Of course, people who do have romantic love in their lives are not defective either. The good life is compatible with both having and not having romantic love. This means that the only other reason why virtue ethics might consider romantic love impermissible is if it were incompatible with one or more virtues. But it does not seem to be. There is nothing about having romantic love in one’s life that goes against kindness, courage, care, temperance, and justice. The moral danger here is similar to the one faced by romantic love and Kantian ethics, which is not to go overboard with romantic love and endanger one’s moral commitments to others." [mijn nadruk] (104)

"The three main moral theories justify romantic love on the basis of liberty. This claim needs two important qualifi cations, regardless of which moral theory we prefer. First, the claim is true only when people generally have true autonomy; under certain social conditions many might not. For example, in societies in which women have few options other than attaching themselves to a man for social and economic support, many women may marry men and (perhaps) eventually love them, simply because they have no other real choices. Sometimes, however, bad social conditions limit autonomy by steering people away from love: in societies in which homophobia or transphobia runs deep, many queer people may not love out of the (conscious or unconscious) fear that it would bring disaster on their heads (e.g., legal persecution, social condemnation). Thus, ideally justifying love on grounds of autonomy is plausible; in practice, the conditions allowing for genuine autonomy must exist for the justification to function." [mijn nadruk] (105)

"On the other hand, commonsense morality comprises a hodgepodge of beliefs, many of which have dubious or unclear origins. The extent to which commonsense morality should be trusted and used as a measuring rod for eval- uating moral theories is tricky. Romantic love provides an excellent example.(...) Sometimes commonsense morality accepts lying, cheating, stealing, and even killing if done in the name of love. Although many people don’t accept such behavior, generally people tend to have a very permissive attitude towards actions done out of love." [mijn nadruk] (106)

[Vaak is er niet zo veel 'sense' in 'common sense' inderdaad. Reden om die opvattingen te wantrouwen. ]

"This not only answers the question of what commonsense morality has to say about the permissibility of romantic love but also illustrates a problem: if commonsense morality is permissive when it comes to love, should we believe commonsense morality or a moral theory that places restrictions on love? I argue in support of restrictive moral theories, starting with the example of John and Janet." [mijn nadruk] (106-107)

Moral Restrictions on Love

"Love’s tendency to make lovers self-absorbed, pulling them away from others and their moral dues, can only contribute to making the lovers morally worse. This section outlines some of the ways that morality restricts love. These restrictions can be divided into three groups: restrictions on how to act towards the beloved and others, on how one feels towards and thinks about the beloved, and on the bases of or the reasons for the love. Let us start with the ones on action." [mijn nadruk] (108)

"The restrictions exist in the form of moral obligations to others, including the beloved. Crucial obligations to the beloved include being honest, not harming the beloved, maintaining and promoting his or her proper well-being, keeping whatever (reasonable?) promises were made, being fair to the beloved, helping and supporting the beloved in pursuing his or her goals, making reparations in case the lover wronged the beloved, and having sex with the beloved (when certain conditions are in place)." [mijn nadruk] (108)

"The moral restrictions on love also take the form of obligations to others, to family members, friends, colleagues, and strangers—they are the usual obligations that we all have in virtue of the various relationships that we have with others. The issue here is that sometimes the fulfillment of these obligations is hard given the desires of love, and a proper, moral love ought to heed them." [mijn nadruk] (109)

"Finally, lovers have obligations to themselves, which are part and parcel of our general obligations to ourselves"(109)

"Romantic love, like other intimate relationships, involves preferential treatment. So long as this treatment does not come at the expense of the lovers’ violation of their duties and decent treatment of others, it is morally permissible, and all the main moral theories concur. They justify its existence on the basis of autonomy. But love has no built-in moral guarantees, and lovers need to monitor their treatment of each other and of others. Those with the virtues might be in the best position to do so."(115)

(118) 4 - Is Love a Moral Emotion?

"This chapter starts by examining recent attempts by some philosophers to show that romantic love is a moral emotion. I argue that they all fail. I then argue that there is a way to show that romantic love is a moral emotion, but that it is a weak or limited way. The chapter ends with a discussion about whether it is prudent to have romantic love in our lives."(118)

"However, recently a few philosophers have attempted to argue that love in itself is a moral phenomenon or emotion. The general idea behind this claim is that romantic love is in itself a positive moral force—it is inherently a morally good thing."(118)

[Waarna weer allerlei auteurs besproken worden. Ik heb het snel doorgenomen.]

(155) Part II - Sex

(157) 5 - What Is Sex?

"In this chapter, I consider some attempts to define three crucial concepts in sex: “sexual act,” “sexual desire,” and “sexual pleasure,” and some attempts to define three types of sexual activity: “adultery,” “casual sex,” and “prostitution.” Defining these concepts allows us to reach interesting insights about sex and to learn how to think philosophically in the process."(157)

[Hierna weer zo'n vervelende bespreking met voorbeelden en tegenvoorbeelden waaruit dan vervolgens blijkt dat het moeilijk is om die begrippen eenduidig te definiëren. Who cares!? ]

"Here is one final attempt: casual sex is sexual activity engaged in between people with no prior deep commitment of which sex is a part and with no beliefs, intentions, or desires that it should lead to such a commitment. This sounds promising."(177)

[En dan zijn we dus al 20 bladzijden verder. En nog volgen er uitzonderingen. En daarna hetzelfde voor het begrip 'overspel' en het begrip 'prostitutie'.]

(191) 6 - Sex, Pleasure, and Consequentialism

"In this chapter, we first examine some philosophical issues that the notion of sexual pleasure raises. We then move to the moral theory of consequentialism to see how it evaluates sexual actions. Because consequentialism assesses actions by their consequences, especially by their tendency to produce pleasure on the utilitarian version of consequentialism (which is the most famous version of consequentialism), consequentialism is apt in this respect."(191)

"One way to evaluate sexual activity is by relying on values such as pleasure, excitement, being rewarding, and satisfaction. Before we delve into these values, a short detour is necessary."(191)

[Ja, omwegen genoeg in dit boek. Dit hoofdstuk alleen maar gescand. ]

(220) 7 - Sex and Virtue

"Virtue ethics is a moral theory that emphasizes the character traits of the person, specifically, the virtues—such as courage, wisdom, temperance, justice, kindness, and generosity—and the vices—such as cowardice, ignorance, greed, injustice, cruelty, and stinginess. This is because virtue ethics is interested in the evaluation of persons: who the good and bad people are and the types in between. The theory has many versions, but perhaps its most famous one is neo-Aristotelian—the version that relies on Aristotle’s view, but with amendments and additions."(220)

[Ook niet wat ik boeiend vind. Gescand.]

"However, some of these preferences are sometimes denounced or considered morally problematic. In addition to what is denounced on the basis of sexual perversion (such as coprophilia, necrophilia, and pedophilia), some claim that having, or not having, preferences for members of a particular racial or ethnic group is problematic (Zheng 2016 and Coleman, unpublished paper.)" [mijn nadruk] (232)

"Those who claim that people with racial preferences are ethically problematic seem to have a couple of things in mind. They often accuse them of exoticization or racism or both. The idea goes as follows: If x sexually prefers members of group G, then x does so because x has stereotypes about them. Stereotypes are bad, and having stereotypes indicates racism. Therefore, x is racist. Therefore, x has a morally bad character. (...) The implication is that one cannot be virtuous if one were to have such racial sexual preferences. How so? How would having such preferences go against virtue?"(233)

(241) 8 - Sexual Objectification

"In this chapter, I start by giving a definition of “objectification,” and then I explain why the concept is morally important. I next explain and defend Immanuel Kant’s views on sexual desire and how it is by nature sexually objectifying. I discuss various attempts to get around the Kantian problem with sex and argue that they fail, partly because they misunderstand Kant. Finally, I turn to a discussion of pornography and the feminist objection that it objectifies and degrades women. I argue that although pornography does objectify, it does not do so just to women, and that feminist objections to the contrary do not succeed."(241)

"But whether the above cases count as objectification depends on how we define the concept."(241)

[Nee, echt? En daar gaan we weer: voorbeelden en tegenvoorbeelden.]

"For although objectification is often about how someone is treated, it is also as often, if not more, matter of attitude: how we perceive or approach someone. Thus, a definition that includes regard is more comprehensive and captures many cases of objectification that do not include treatment. For example, someone looking at pictures of naked women in a magazine sexually objectifies, yet merely through regard, as no treatment is or could be involved. Let us, then, rely on the following definition of “sexual objectification”: x sexually objectifies y if, and only if, x treats or regards y only as a sexual object."(242)

"Understanding sexual objectification is important not only in itself, but also for moral analysis. Indeed, among philosophers, the primary interest in the phenomenon has been moral. To them, sexual objectification is worrisome because it involves the reduction of a person from a status he or she should occupy to one he or she should not. If human beings, regardless of individual merit, have elevated status in virtue of having a lofty property, such as rationality, humanity, dignity, autonomy, sophisticated mental structure, or even affinity with God, reducing someone to a lower level is a moral wrong. But how common the actual occurrence of sexual objectification and how serious it is are different questions. Other than cases of rape, it is rare to treat our sexual partners as mere objects in any obvious and troubling ways: not only are we aware of their humanity but we are attentive to it. This means that if there is sexual objectification in such cases, we have not yet fully uncovered its nature, let alone decided how serious it is.
In the vast literature on objectification, especially by feminist writers who focus on pornography, there is a general tendency to argue that the objectificaftion stems from patriarchy and flows from the direction of men to women— that is, the men tend to be the objectifiers, the women the objectified. Feminist writers also insist that they are not against sex as such—they are not prudish or socially conservative about sex. " [mijn nadruk] (242)

[Maar dat is natuurlijk eenzijdig en vergeet de omgekeerde richting. ]

"If objectification in pornography has to do with sex, then it objectifies both men and women, though to a different extent. I will argue, using the views of the philosopher Immanuel Kant, (1) that sex is by nature objectifying, but (2) that the objectification is usually morally tolerable, and (3) that pornography does not have any additional forms of objectification directed specifically at women, as many feminist writers believe." [mijn nadruk] (243)

[Bijvoorbeeld.]

"The core moral problem with objectification is that if people are not only objects, treating them only as objects dehumanizes or degrades them by lowering them to a level they should not occupy."(243)

[Maar de vraag is: wanneer is dat het geval? ]

"As we will see in our discussion of Kant, this is a crucial consideration that sets sexual desire and activity apart from other activities. It is indeed here where the discussion of sex and objectification lies." [mijn nadruk] (245)

[Waarom zou seksuele activiteit anders behandeld moeten worden dan andere activiteiten? ]

"Kant is right about a crucial aspect of sexual desire: it targets the human being as a body or body parts. As Soble puts it, “The other’s body, his or her lips, thighs, buttocks, and toes, are desired as the arousing parts they are, distinct from the person” (2013b, 302). The phenomenology of sexual desire—how it feels when we undergo it—confirms this point over and again (see Hamilton 2008). As much as many people like to accuse Kant of being prudish, anti-sex, a virgin, or in the grip of a religious ethic that made him lose his senses, we must admit that he is right about this. When under the influence of sexual desire, others’ bodies, whether real or imagined, are our target.
Given that this is how sexual desire works, the conclusion that it objectifies is inescapable: it makes us treat our sexual partner as an object of desire." [mijn nadruk] (253)

[Onzin. Dan ga je er van uit dat seksueel verlangen alleen maar lichamelijk is en uitgaat naar lichamen. Alsof we een dier zijn. Maar het normale seksuele verlangen is altijd ingebed in een veld van betekenissen en anderen zijn dus niet zomaar alleen een object. ]

(280) 9 - Sexual Perversion and Sexual Fantasy

"In this chapter, we discuss numerous philosophical accounts of sexual perversion. Although I argue that all fail to capture what sexual perversion is, we derive some important insights about sex and sexuality from discussing them. I then offer what I consider to be a recipe for a plausible account of sexual perversion, though I shy away from giving a full-fledged account. Next, I turn to sexual fantasy, discuss some of it kinds, and discuss the following questions: (1) whether there is something ethically wrong about sexually fantasizing about someone else while having sex with the person you love or are in a rela- tionship with; and (2) whether having sexual fantasies with morally troubling content reflects badly on the moral character of the person who has them. I end the chapter with a discussion of the fantasies and desires involved in BDSM."(280)

[Volgt weer een uitgebreide bespreking van de standpunten van allerlei auteurs.]

(323) Part III - Marriage

(325) 10 What Is Marriage?

"In this chapter, we will first look at some cultural and historical variations of marriage that indicate that marriage does not have a fixed purpose across cultures or within the same culture through time, despite what a group of persistent philosophers (the New Natural Lawyers) claim. The concept of “marriage,” however, might have a more or less general meaning within cultures. Still, I argue that the door is open for allowing marriages that go beyond opposite-sex and same-sex to include transgender partners (including people with a fluid sexual or gender identity), marriages of bisexuals, and group marriages."(325)

"However, the debate about same-sex marriage has raised and will continue to raise two important factors that will always be part of the debate about marriage in general: the sex or gender of the parties to the marriage and their number. With transgender issues on the rise, and with polyamory becoming more and more visible, in concept if not also in practice, the sex/gender and the number of marital partners are guaranteed a place in the debate. In the next chapter we will also look at another crucial albeit implicit feature of marriage: its intended length or duration."(325)

"In what follows, always keep in mind that marriage in the contemporary world is a legal arrangement between people involving the state as a third party, though, of course, it is also more than that. Marriage’s legality will occupy us for much of the next chapter, but keeping it in mind is crucial to appreciate the issues raised in this chapter as well."(326)

"According to Coontz, there are two commonalities to marriage found across cultures. First, and with the exception of one culture (the Na people in China), marriage is a universal social institution: every society had, and still has, one form of it or another. Second, marriage was always subject to some set rules, though the rules were not always enshrined in law and they varied, of course, from one time to another and from one culture to another (Coontz 2005, 24–26)." [mijn nadruk] (326)

[Maar de historische en culturele variatie is er op allerlei punten. Ik neem even de kopjes over:]

" (1) Marriage does not always involve the cohabitation of the spouses
(2) Marriage does not always involve the economic cooperation of the spouses
(3) Marriage does not always involve a man and a woman
(4) Marriage does not always involve another human being as a spouse
(5) Marriage does not involve being married to only one spouse at a time
(6) Marriage does not always involve the regulation of property and inheritance rights
(7) Marriage does not always involve the reproduction and rearing of children
(8) Marriage is not always intended to be “forever”
(9) Marriage does not always involve a non-related spouse
(10) Marriage is not always regulated by the state"(326-329)

"Thus, marriage was, and is, not always for love. Indeed, it was rare that people married for love. If we are to list common reasons for marriage, they would be: pooling economic resources, rearing children to increase a family’s labor force, obtaining in-laws to forge economic and, especially in the case of the ruling classes, political alliances, producing legitimate heirs to the throne (in the case of royalty), and legitimizing sexual relationships (in the majority of marital regulations, a marriage that was never consummated is considered void and the demise of sexual activity between the spouses is often considered sufficient grounds for divorce); the last reason brings in its tow the idea that marriage should be monogamous." [mijn nadruk] (329)

"Perhaps, then, the more plausible way to define “marriage” is normatively: what marriage should be."(329)

[Maar die normen zijn natuurlijk cultuur- en groepsgebonden. Iemand kan wel zeggen dat een huwelijk X moet zijn, maar iemand anders kan net zo gemakkelijk zeggen dat een huwelijk Y moet zijn. Dus dan gaat macht weer een rol spelen: een staat of een ideologie of een religie die X aan iedereen oplegt bijvoorbeeld.. ]

"Second, the above historical and cultural variations in marriage show (and so does reason) that there are no conceptual or necessary connections between love, sex, and marriage, three things that are today considered to “naturally” go together (see the conclusion of this book)." [mijn nadruk] (329)

"For now, let us next consider a school of philosophy that has attempted to provide a definition of the very nature or essence of marriage, one that is meant to underlie all of marriage’s cultural and temporal variations.
Many people today understand marriage to be a phenomenon inclusive of same-sex couples. The tradition of the New Natural Law attempts to revise and correct the way that these people understand marriage, arguing that marriage is really between one man and one woman (understood in such a way as to exclude transgender people). Let us look into their views and evaluate them." [mijn nadruk] (330)

[Waarom zou je aandacht besteden aan een onzinnige theorie in lijn met Aquinas en christenen? Ook de volgende besproken theorie is onzinnig: die van het "slippery slope argument".]

"The essence of the slippery-slope argument is that accepting same-sex marriages opens the door to accepting other forms of marriage that are immoral, such as group marriages and marriages between siblings, parents and children, and people and animals. In the causal version, the argument states that accepting same-sex marriage will probably or certainly lead to these unacceptable marriages."(339)

"Despite the divorce revolution, Americans still take it for granted that marriage means monogamy. The ideal of fidelity may be breached in practice, yet adultery is clearly understood as a transgression against marriage."(340)

"So far, then, Kurtz’s reasons that same-sex marriage will actually lead to polygamy and polyamory, let alone to other clearly unacceptable forms of mar- riage, are unimpressive."(341)

[Dat spreekt bijna vanzelf.]

"The “lack of principles” version claims that accepting same-sex marriages removes any principles on which basis we could prevent these unacceptable marriages, even if they do not actually occur. A number of conservative commentators have voiced this version of the argument."(341)

[Uiteraard. Gescand.]

"Third, a discussion of polygamous and polyamorous marriages in their legal forms is bound to be extremely difficult because in Western societies no polygamous or polyamorous marriages exist (and I know of no society in which the latter exists). Because marriage involves a host of legal rights, both as duties and privileges, trying to imagine how polygamous and polyamorous marriages would be legally organized were they to exist is, to use an understatement, daunting."(354)

"The philosopher John McMurtry, in an essay from 1984 aptly titled, “Monogamy: A Critique,” raises serious moral problems with monogamy. His essay is valuable and instructive, and it remains a cornerstone of a discussion of the problems of monogamous marriage."(354)

"Moreover, we cannot discuss these marriages simply by imagining our culture and society as they are and grafting the marriages onto them; they cannot simply be part of current society and culture. For them to exist, society will have to accommodate them, which means that it will have to undergo major changes, because as it exists today, society is hostile to them. So simply seeing how polygamous and polyamorous marriages would fit in today’s society might be a futile exercise (it might be easier to think about them as non-marital relationships, because the legality of marriage complicates things tremendously)." [mijn nadruk] (357)

(364) 11 - Is Marriage Necessary?

"This chapter explains and evaluates some of the main arguments against marriage as it currently is. Some call for its abolition while others call for its radical reform. Such reforms include having “minimal” marriage and having the option of temporary marriage. The chapter also discusses the issue of whether marriage remains marriage in light of these criticisms and proposals."(364)

"Marriage, in today’s world, is a legal arrangement that involves the state as a third party. It confers a number of legal benefits and responsibilities on married couples, though what these are vary from country to country and even from jurisdiction to jurisdiction in the same country." [mijn nadruk] (364)

"So marriage is important for individuals given the benefits and rights it grants the spouses automatically upon marrying. These benefits and rights prove crucial in assessing arguments for and against marriage."(365)

"Marriage is also an important social institution: it signals to the rest of society that two people have vowed to commit themselves to each other, allowing the couple to openly and publicly celebrate this commitment.(...) Moreover, and despite the fact that the state is involved in marriage, it is not clear that the social glorification of marriage is due to, or only to, the state backing of marriage. This, too, will prove to be a crucial point."(365-366)

"Insofar as the state confers benefits on marital couples not conferred on other people, it might be accused of taking sides in how people ought to live their lives. It is basically sending the message to the people that “The state thinks that marriage is a good thing, and we will support those who participate in it by providing them with many benefits.” But since being married is not a basic, neutral good that people need to lead fulfilling lives, but one that reflects a specific ideology about, say, couple-hood and love, the state would not be neutral in supporting marriage. Thus, according to these critics, the state should not be in the business of marriage (Garrett 2009; Metz 2010). This, too, will prove to be a crucial point." [mijn nadruk] (366)

Arguments Against Marriage

"To Card, while denying benefits to same-sex partners is an injustice, marriage as an institution is an evil. Evils are “culpable wrongs that foreseeably produce intolerable harms” (2013, 183)."(370)

"Even if the state does not regulate intimate relationships, it is hard to see how the state cannot but interfere in those relationships that involve children, because it has a justified interest in the well-being of children and some laws will have to exist to ensure their well-being.(...) The point is that the abolition of marriage would in all likelihood not get around the state’s role in monitoring the lives and future of the children of broken-up intimate unions. This is not just a factual point or a prediction of the future course of the law. It is also a normative point: the state has good reasons to ensure that children are well brought up and looked after decently." [mijn nadruk] (371)

[Dat laatste snap ik niet. Waarom zou dat de staat moeten zijn?]

"In addition, if the state provides benefits for all its citizens, regardless of their marital status, marriage as an institution would not be complicit in an overall unjust distribution of benefits, and individuals would not need to marry just to attain those benefits. Thus, making unilateral divorce legal and ensuring a just distribution of benefits would, I contend, disarm much of the power of Card’s criticisms against marriage. Intimate state involvement may still be a problem, but it would not be an evil, as Card contends."(371)

"However, while all of the above is true, we are left with one crucial question: If marriage is essentially a legal issue, and if, to make marriage morally acceptable, the laws have to be complex, why have marriage at all? Why not just let people form their own arrangements as they see fit? Indeed, even if the laws of marriage are made simple, this would not change the above question in its basics: why have marriage if it is going to involve the interfer- ence of the state? The question is given further urgency when we remember that historically speaking the state was not always involved in marriage" [mijn nadruk] (371)

"This argument against same-sex marriage relies on the idea that such marriages would assimilate gay people into mainstream society, thus eroding their unique identities and unwittingly undermining any goals to transform society. The argument can be extended to other non-traditional marriages, such as group ones or bi-marriages. But there are two reasons why this is not a serious worry."(372)

"Thus, the cultural injustice argument does not settle the question of whether marriage should continue to exist as a legal institution or whether it should be abolished. If there are important reasons for the state to regulate the kind of commitments found in marriage, then we have to accept marriage and try to combat the cultural injustices that result from it ..."(375)

Reforming Marriage

"The philosopher Elizabeth Brake has provided an influential criticism and reconceptualization of marriage in her 2012 book Minimizing Marriage."

"Brake’s suggestion for minimizing marriage is very interesting. In one stroke, she provides a good reason why a liberal state should not be supporting marriage the way it currently is given that it is based on non-neutral views of what marriage is. Yet she also insists on state support for caring relationships because they are basic goods that any person needs to live well. Caring relationships thus provide seemingly politically and morally neutral bases for state support; everyone is invested in caring, no matter who one is. In addition, the suggestion, if it becomes a reality, would help with the social issues of marriage by extending the institution to many relationships currently socially marginalized. It would send the message to intimate friends and to amatory groups that their relationships are also valuable and worthy of state protection and social recognition. Brake’s view does, however, face some difficulties. Let’s look into them." [mijn nadruk] (377)

"But there are reasons to believe that private contracts between the parties are not sufficient. One reason is their sheer cost: anyone who has employed the services of a lawyer in this country (and most others) knows quite well how expensive they can be."(378)

[Een goede redenen om die kosten ver omlaag te brengen en niet aan de beroepsgroep over te laten.]

"Thus, the state is needed to oblige third parties to act when it comes to certain crucial aspects of the contracts and to legally address the rights and the welfare of related parties that the contracts do not, and cannot, address. (Brake 2012, 181; Chambers 2016)."(379)

"We have seen that arguments for abolishing marriage are not convincing, and that state intervention in some form and in some adult human relationships is necessary. Specifically, we have seen that there is a need for the state to support many more caring relationships than what currently go under the label of “marriage.” Of course, that state support is necessary does not mean that marriage is. State-supported relationships lead to the question of whether they should be called “marriage” and what effects this would have on the social and political status of marriage—all open questions. Indeed, whether we will have marriage if minimal marriage and temporary marriages were to exist, and exist somewhat commonly, is the question." [mijn nadruk] (389)

(392) Concluding Remarks

[Hij komt hier met visies op mensen en liefde. Hij is voorstander van de vierde: een totaal pessimistisch beeld van mensen en liefde en seks. Een onzinnig standpunt. En erg Amerikaans ook. ]